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Tämän insinöörityön tarkoitus oli tutkia esitystekniikan järjestelmiä ja niiden potentiaalisia 
tietoturvauhkia. Tähän valittiin kolme aihepiiriä. Nämä ovat videoneuvottelulaitteet, audio 
verkon yli- ja IP kuulutusjärjestelmät. Työ kirjoitettiin Pöyry Finland Oy:n MCN teamille. 
 
Insinöörityön ensimmäinen osa kattaa videoneuvottelulaitteet yleisellä tasolla ja potentiaa-
liset tietoturva-aukkoja kuten myös erilaisia ratkaisuja näihin. Toinen osa on audio verkon 
yli ja sen muutos analogisista järjestelmistä digitaalisiin. Käsiteltävänä on Dante, 
AVB/TSN, Ravenna ja muita erilaisia esitystekniikan järjestelmiä. Viimeiseksi, IP kuulutus-
järjestelmät ovat kolmas aihepiiri insinöörityössä. 
 
Selvitys antoi joitain ratkaisuja kuinka välttää tietoturva-aukkoja videoneuvottelujärjestel-
missä, mutta ei selvää ratkaisua tilanteesta riippumatta, joka olisi myös helppo ottaa käyt-
töön. Tärkein keino on laittaa laitteet palomuurin taakse ja konfiguroida palomuuri tilanteen 
mukaan. Tosin tämä ei ole niin helppoa kuin miltä se kuulostaa. Tämä auttaa joihinkin, 
ehkä useimpiin uhkiin, mutta on olemassa myös muita keinoja parantaa turvallisuutta ku-
ten H.323 välimuistipalvelin ja/tai portinvahti mahdollisesti myös samassa yhteydessä, 
toimien puhelun välittäjänä. 
 
Yhtään vakavaa tietoturvauhkaa, joka olisi ainoastaan audio verkon yli-järjestelmissä, ei 
löytynyt. Dante, AVB/TSN ja muut järjestelmät toimivat palomuurin takana välttäen pa-
himmat uhat. Tästä johtuen aihetta käsiteltiin enemmän yleisellä tasolla ja vähemmän tie-
toturvan näkökulmasta. Sama voidaan sanoa IP kuulutusjärjestelmistä. 
 
Audio-/video laitteet ovat siirtyneet koko ajan enemmän digitaaliseen muotoon. Tämä vaa-
tii, että tietoverkkosuunnittelijat tuntevat näiden järjestelmien toiminnan suunnitellessaan 
tietoverkkoja. Tulevaisuudessa tämä kehitys ainoastaan kiihtyy, kun järjestelmät eteneväs-
sä määrin käyttävät hyväkseen IP protokollia ja vanhoja analogisia järjestelmiä uusitaan. 
Avainsanat Videoneuvottelu, audio verkon yli, Dante, AVB/TSN, IP kuulu-
tusjärjestelmät 
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The purpose of this thesis was to investigate presentation technology systems and their 
potential security holes. Three different areas in audio/video were chosen for this. These 
were Video Conferencing, Audio over Ethernet and IP announcement systems. This study 
was carried out for Mission Critical Network team of Pöyry Finland Oy. 
 
The first part of this thesis covers Video Conferencing on a general level and potential se-
curity breaches it has following different solutions for these problems. The second part 
deals with Audio over Ethernet and current transformation from analogue to digital sys-
tems. Dante AVB/TSN, Ravenna and various other presentation technology systems are 
covered. Lastly, IP announcement systems are explained. 
 
The analysis offered some solutions for Video Conferencing systems regarding how to 
avoid security breaches, but no obvious fix for all situations was found that would be easy 
to implement. The most important thing is to put the devices behind a firewall and config-
ure the firewall according to the situation. This is not as easy as it sounds though. This will 
prevent some, if not most threats and there are also other ways to improve security like 
H.323 proxy and/or gatekeeper possibly together acting as middle ground in the call. 
 
Upon analysing Audio over Ethernet, no major security threat unique to it was found. Dan-
te, AVB and others often operate behind firewall avoiding the worst threats. Thus the focus 
was more on systems on a general level and less on the security perspective. The same 
can be said for IP announcement systems.    
 
Audio/video devices have been moving to a digitalized form more and more recently. This 
makes the knowledge of these systems necessary for network engineers when designing 
networks. In future this progress only increases while systems evolve to take advantage of 
IP protocols. 
Keywords Video Conferencing, Audio over Ethernet, Dante, AVB/TSN, 
IP Announcement systems, Public Address systems 
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Abbreviations 
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol. Protocol for audio and video over IP net-
works. 
SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol. Secure version of RTP. 
RTCP RTP Control Protocol. Statistics for RTP protocol. 
SIP Session Initiate Protocol. Used to control multimedia sessions. 
QoS Quality of Service. Prioritized traffic. 
DMZ Demilitarized zone. 
LAN Local Area Network. 
VLAN Virtual LAN. 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
AES67 Audio-over-IP standard. 
VPN Virtual Private Network.  
GPS Global Positioning System.  
AVB Audio Video Bridging 
TSN Time Sensitive Networking 
PTP Precision Time Protocol 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate audio and video elements of internet proto-
col networks like Audio over Ethernet and IP announcement systems. The aim is to 
describe how to implement these functions securely as a comprehensive solution. This 
thesis also includes theory related to these subjects and is written for Mission Critical 
Network team of Pöyry Finland Oy. The chosen method for this is literary research. The 
purpose is to design networks without weak spots in the information security. This is 
done by researching current literature for potential issues related to information security 
and further expand it to show practical examples of how the network could be breached 
and protected from these threats.  
One potential threat was found in video conferencing systems. IP-based video confer-
encing has spread to everywhere due to its many advantages compared to travelling 
which is time and money consuming. Some of the possible problems include the abuse 
of built-in properties and insecure settings, information leaks and even unauthorized 
access to the rest of the network. 
2 General Principles 
This section determines general guidelines for designing and maintaining a secure 
network especially for the subjects chosen for this thesis. 
2.1 Definition of needs 
The starting point should always be what is required in order to run the wanted opera-
tions in the network and based on that define which devices, services, protocols ports 
and such are necessary. Every installed piece of software offers a potential attack sur-
face to illegitimate access systems. Increased security in systems often adds an extra 
step to the user which, in turn, affects easy usability or at least increases the cost of 
maintenance of the network. For this reason proper planning is essential to find cost 
effective ways for it and make sure security mechanisms are not too laborious which 
could cause users to circumvent them. 
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A decision is required to decide which resources need to be protected and on what 
level. This of course assumes the network is properly documented and all devices are 
accounted for. Unfortunately this is not always the case. The next step is finding all the 
pieces how to implement this. Each technology has its limitations and these should be 
known to cover for any weaknesses. 
2.2 Defence in depth 
It should always be remembered that a single security mechanism is never enough 
alone. A proper security design has layers of several fail safes if one is breached. In an 
optimal situation each layer has a clear function in the system. Different manufacturers 
might have difficulties with one another when combining products. These can affect the 
whole picture and cannot be ignored.  
2.3 Awareness of potential vulnerabilities 
Maintaining sufficient information security is more than just patching software after the 
system is up and running. Additional systems could offer a way past a well-protected 
core network. 
Video conferencing seems to be a blind spot for some. It may be an unconventional 
method, but still an effective way to gain information about the target. This also expos-
es the rest of the network to attacks launched from video conferencing devices. 
3 Protocols 
This section explains briefly different protocols that are used in Video Conferencing, 
Audio over Ethernet and IP Announcement systems. 
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3.1 H.323 
H.323 is a common standard in video conferencing and important to configure properly 
[1]. The management and updating of H.323 devices are sometimes done through an 
unprotected connection, for example Telnet, HTTP or FTP. In an internal network this 
is not necessarily a risk, but externally it should never be done.  
There are several H.323 related security issues in video conferencing that may not 
apply in all cases. For example a system used only in an internal network is easier to 
secure, because it is possible to coordinate systems and settings to work better to-
gether. [2]  
3.2 H.235 
H.235 is a sub protocol of H.323 and it encrypts traffic [3], but implementing it may not 
be simple. All clients may not support this protocol and performance can be another 
issue. Sending encrypted packets through a firewall could increase latency. This is one 
of the points where the maximum amount of security and performance cannot always 
be combined at the same time. Compatibility with end devices that do not support en-
cryption also suffers. Video conferencing traffic is real time traffic and sensitive to dis-
turbance, latency should not be more than 300 msec [4]. If Multi Control Units exist in 
the network, they also need to support the H.235 protocol [2]. 
VPN can be used for encryption, but it does not scale well on bigger environments with 
many different source networks in the same call. It would have to go through various 
H.323 devices with encryption support on the way [5] and everything after a basic 
point-to-point connection with two participants adds more complexity. [6] 
3.3 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
Session Initiation Protocol is used to control multimedia sessions and use RTP or 
SRTP. It is utilized in video conferencing, announcement systems, Voice over IP sys-
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tems as well as possibly with the AES67 protocol. [7] The SIP protocol has many 
mechanisms to provide more security [8]. 
3.4 Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) 
The main purpose for the Real-time Transport Protocol is to minimize latency. This is 
done by monitoring the sent packets and trying to detect lost ones. The RTP header 
also gives instructions how to compile data at the receiver’s end. Examples of protocols 
that use RTP are SIP and H.323. [9: p. 5] It is used with real time traffic because TCP 
and UDP do not manage a high volume of time sensitive data well [10: p. 1]. 
3.5 Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) 
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol protects RTP data by taking over data pack-
ets on the way. From that point on the packets are considered as SRTPs. Only the 
payload is encrypted, but message authentication is taken care of for the payload and 
header. Before packets reach their destination, data is converted again to the original 
RTP form. There are many variations for different security solutions depending on the 
application and how secure it needs to be. Compatibility with current systems is an 
important factor when deciding which one is the most suitable. [11: p. 31] [12] 
3.6 RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) 
The RTP Control Protocol controls RTP and monitors statistics related to transmission 
including QoS [9: p. 10]. These include for example jitter and the number of packets 
sent or lost on the way. This can be useful when quality in the multimedia is adjusted to 
the available bandwidth and needs to be on a specific level. [9: p. 23]   
Scalability with multicast is a potential problem if monitoring is maintained because the 
number of destinations increase and each one requires their own control traffic. The 
monitoring traffic should not affect actual multimedia traffic; at that point it does not 
serve its purpose anymore. [9: p. 24]   
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3.7 AES67 
AES67 is trying to do something the digital audio market needs right now. It was pub-
lished in September 2013 [13]. Often the problem with new technology in a new, still 
forming market is a fractured way of different concepts that are competing with each 
other. Each company has its own standards that may not work well together if put to 
the same network. Digital audio networking is still a relatively new market and so far 
poor compatibility between vendors has been an issue. AES67 plans to correct this. 
The use of the SIP protocol with or without the SIP Server is possible. SIP is required if 
point-to-point connection is used, but point-to-multicast connection does not need SIP 
protocol. [14]  
AES67 is a layer 3 protocol and is not an independent standard by itself. Instead it is 
based on standards already established and does not even intend to replace other 
standards. Rather it works alongside them making sure relevant parts of compatibility 
are covered and try to make sure technical issues do not prevent adapting new tech-
nology to full benefit. [15: p. 14]  
3.8 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) 
Precision Time Protocol is used for time synchronization in many places and purposes, 
for example in the Dante networks. It provides a way to send time sensitive packets 
between devices using one master clock and slave clocks. [16] 
3.9 Quality of Service (QoS) 
Quality of Service is a complex subject to discuss in detail and for purposes of thesis 
this subject is not covered. In general it could be said that QoS is an important feature 
for audio and video networks prioritizing traffic for latency sensitive traffic. 
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4 Applications 
This section covers the main part of the thesis. Three different instances of presenta-
tion technology are discussed in detail; these are video conferencing application, Audio 
over Ethernet method and IP announcement systems. The main focus of video confer-
encing is on the security perspective while the rest of the two instances are described 
more on a general level, security included. 
4.1 Video Conferencing 
Video conferencing as a term can include a huge variety of solutions from dedicated 
systems to software based solutions like Skype or Hangouts. Software based solutions 
have improved in quality, having for example more options as to how many persons 
participate in a call. In future the popularity of these will probably rise at the cost of oth-
er options [17]. This thesis does not analyse these further and will, instead, concentrate 
on dedicated systems. 
Interoperability between different vendors can be a problem if the devices use proprie-
tary features and also depending on whether the solution is based on software or 
hardware. All this depends on how much manufacturers and service providers will co-
operate with each other in future. [18] 
The conflict between the ease of set up and information security also affects usability. 
For example the auto-answer function itself is of course a useful feature, but can be 
problematic in terms of security. In 2012, there was a stir related to about how vulnera-
ble some video conferencing systems are. [19] [20] 
A security company called Rapid7 published research about this potential problem and 
demonstrated in practice how to scan vulnerable systems on the internet. They 
scanned 3% of the addresses on internet searching devices using the H.323 protocol. 
A total of 250 000 systems were found. [21] 
This triggered a response from Telepresence Options, a publication for video confer-
encing devices. Their opinion was that this was just being exaggerated out of propor-
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tion and not really any serious threat. The main point was how everything can be se-
cured so let’s not worry. While this is technically true, the author at Telepresence Op-
tions dodged the actual problem and replied to a different question. [22] Unfortunately 
the best security practices are not followed everywhere as Rapid7 demonstrated in 
their research. 
4.1.1 Physical security 
Physical security is an important part of setting up a secure network. There are several 
precautions that should be taken. Sensitive documents should not be left on tables at 
all, but especially not where there are video conferencing cameras in the room which 
can be activated without the owner being aware. Some models unfortunately do not 
have a clear indication if it is active, for example in the form of status LED. One way to 
cover for this is hooding the camera. Not exactly a hi-tech solution, but it gets the job 
done. 
After devices leave the house, they have to be put to the default state. Contact infor-
mation inside the device is valuable content for people trying to get access to other 
networks. Also, phone numbers should not be public knowledge. 
4.1.2 Insecure default settings 
As with most systems, default settings are usually insecure in some way and need to 
be changed. This can be tough to balance for manufacturers sometimes. There are 
different network setups and different settings required. More secure settings means 
more complexity for the set up and companies seem to have trust in customers to ap-
ply these settings themselves if applicable, especially Polycom.  
Auto-answer is perhaps the most common setting in this case and the one that got at-
tention from a New York Times article. [20] It should not be turned on, but in case it is 
there are a few things to make it more secure. The camera can be auto-muted to pre-
vent eavesdropping and sound has to be enabled manually. [21] The camera position 
can be locked in place initially and it cannot be moved without the owner’s action. [21] 
Also there is a possibility to add password protection to the session to keep any un-
wanted guests out. 
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Most manufacturers have auto-answer disabled, but the previously mentioned 
measures are still useful as a precaution. There might also be a functionality to leave a 
video message if the receiver does not answer. 
4.1.3 Gatekeeper 
Gatekeeper is not a mandatory part of the network setup, but still preferred. There are 
two ways to implement it, pure software or hardware. It makes for example dialling eas-
ier, and removes the need to choose different IP addresses as receivers when calling. 
Instead it translates these to clearly understood names. Gatekeeper can also be used 
to H.323 endpoint access control with gateway and Multi Control Unit, from endpoint to 
outside the network. Another function is bandwidth control; it does this in a centralized 
and scalable way. It is possible to put only one active gatekeeper per zone. Zone is 
basically a set of H.323 devices crossing the limits of subnets. [23] 
There are several levels to choose from depending on how heavy a solution is re-
quired. More functions mean of course more complexity to the configurations. It acts as 
a buffer between recipients adding an additional layer of security. 
Some functions are optional and can be used in call management. This includes things 
like handling status of endpoints, for instance is it free or occupied at the moment. Or 
bandwidth management, it is important to let the caller through only if there is enough 
bandwidth available. Otherwise the network will be congested and the video calls may 
start to take bandwidth from other services. It is also possible to manage security poli-
cies through gatekeeper. [23]  
To be on the safe side auto discovery of gatekeepers could be turned off and all gate-
keepers added manually. [23] This is only a minor issue, but in theory an unauthorized 
gatekeeper could try to join the network. A balance between slightly less maintenance 
and more security needs to be decided once again. 
4.1.4 Eavesdropping 
The most crucial step to prevent eavesdropping is to set up a firewall for the video con-
ferencing devices. In this case it is not a simple task. The reason for that is the wide 
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range of ports the H.323 protocol uses. For starters the Access Control Lists on a rout-
er offer limited protection defining allowed source IP address for the endpoints, but this 
is possible to do mostly when calls are done only internally. 
While the call starts with known fixed ports, problems come later. Endpoints negotiate 
ports dynamically and create problems if no additional component is added to the net-
work topology. This is because the range for ports is 1024-65 535, meaning the firewall 
would not mean anything after opening all these ports. [24] Table 1 below shows the 
most important ports for video conferencing. It includes general protocols and products 
from the different manufacturers. 
Table 1. Important ports for video conferencing [24] [25] 
System/Service/Device TCP UDP 
Cisco 5555 - 5574 2326 - 2485 
Polycom (fixed ports) 3230 - 3243 3230 - 3290 
Lifesize 60 000 - 64 999[26] 60 000 - 64 999 
Sony 2253 - 2255 49 152 - 49 239 
Remote Management by (HTTP) or 
HTTPS 
(80) & 433 (only for 
internal use) 
 Remote Management by SSH 22 (only for internal use) 
 LDAP 389 
 Audio Call Control 1731 
 H.323 1720 
 SIP 5060, 5061[26] 5060 
Dynamic H.245 1024 - 65 535 
 Dynamic RTP (Video) 
 
1024 - 65 535 
Dynamic RTP (Audio) 
 
1024 - 65 535 
Dynamic RTCP (Control Information) 
 
1024 - 65 535 
Gatekeeper 
 
1718, 1719 
 
It was not possible to include all of the ports; Polycom alone has a much longer list 
than this depending on what devices are used. [24] The number of ports actually used 
varies with factors like protocols and the amount of participants in the call [26]. Some-
times it is possible to configure what ports or range of them is used instead of dynamic 
ports [25]. 
There are many possible solutions to this problem and what those require are dis-
cussed in detail next. There is no clear best way for all cases; it depends on many vari-
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ables, topology and available resources among other things. Figure 1 shows the H.323 
Proxy outside the firewall. 
 
 
Figure 1. H.323 Proxy outside the firewall. [27] 
As shown in Figure 1, the H.323 proxy acts as middle ground for establishing the call 
and routing between participants after that. It uses own addresses between endpoints 
and takes care of the table of current calls. This way only limited information about the 
network is revealed to the participant receiving the packets. [28] The proxy also makes 
firewall configuration regarding H.323 simple, H.323 traffic passing through the firewall 
is forwarded to the proxy [29]. The endpoints need to support proxy functionalities as a 
two way communication and even if only one recipient is using it, all of them need at 
least partial support of the H.323 proxy [30]. The use of NAT is not recommended 
when H.323 proxy is outside the firewall. This setup creates unnecessary traffic over-
head between the endpoints and the gatekeeper. [28] Only its external address is for-
warded to outside and in many ways it works like a web proxy. The H.323 proxy and 
Gatekeeper functions might be combined to one device [27]. 
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If the proxy gets infected the attacker does not get direct access to inside and has to go 
through a firewall. The downside to this is higher bandwidth use and possible perfor-
mance issues because the packets have to go twice through the firewall. [27] Figure 2 
illustrates a more performance driven approach. The proxy is put behind the firewall 
and traffic does not travel the extra distance to reach H.323 terminal. At the same time 
the inside network is more vulnerable to attacks against proxy. 
 
Figure 2. H.323 proxy behind firewall. [27] 
The existing cables might make it impractical to implement one or another. Determining 
the best solution depends on the network topology and what priorities are the most 
important. 
In theory, an H.323 aware firewall is a good way to solve this problem. There is no ad-
ditional hardware to install, but it can burden the firewall’s CPU to the limit where it 
cannot handle traffic fast enough anymore. Another issue is the different versions of 
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H.323. A firewall is more expensive and complex to replace than a smaller separate 
device when the new version comes out. 
The principle of DMZ deployment is to place the H.323 endpoint to outside the internal 
network and keep everything else safe. It does not directly help with the security issues 
discussed here, but isolates it from the critical part of the network. The topology may 
make this impractical to implement in bigger networks and the cabling required might 
be a too big effort. This can make sense as part of the plan in security sense, but alone 
it is definitely not enough.   
Another angle to go through is endpoints and their functionalities. One option is NAT; it 
translates the internal address to a public one. With a public address the problem of 
randomly determined ports is outsourced to NAT and it handles the traffic through a 
firewall. The endpoint knows it has both internal and external address, using external 
address on data packets. This may not be supported by the endpoint. [31] 
Some endpoints make it possible to choose used ports in calls and after that it is easier 
to configure the firewall with those ports. This forces H.323 to be more firewall friendly. 
The first version of H.323 was published in 1996 and since then it has evolved a lot. 
Version 7 was published in 2009 among other things offering a new possibility that may 
make the previously mentioned problem easier to solve. It adds functionality where the 
gatekeeper negotiates with NAT or Firewall to ensure endpoints can communicate di-
rectly with each other and keep latency lower. [32] This procedure happens before the 
call starts and reduces time to establish a connection. Potentially this could make se-
cure H.323 endpoints more feasible to implement without decreasing usability or per-
formance if the gatekeeper, endpoints and other associated devices support it.   
When video calls travel to the external network there is a potential threat of man-in-the-
middle attack. This makes it possible to intercept traffic and record video and sound 
without either participant noticing. The possibility of this can be reduced with encryp-
tion, but there are some problems with this. [33] These are discussed in Section 3.2.  
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4.1.5 Administrative interface 
An administrative interface comes in many forms depending on the manufacturer as a 
way to configure the system remotely. These include for example via web, centralized 
service and console-based interface, automated or manual. 
The most important here is to set up a strong password to at least make it harder to 
access the network. Without a password it is relatively easy to change the settings. An 
additional precaution is preventing anyone accessing management interfaces external-
ly with a firewall, unless specifically needed. 
4.1.6 Device logs 
The device logs should be checked regularly for unusual activity. These could include 
calls from unknown source, unusual time or device activity during the time the meeting 
room was supposed to be empty and no scheduled meeting there. If the logs need to 
be accessed from individual devices, there is a danger the logs are never touched in 
reality due to time consuming process involved. There are ways to make this easier, 
additional components might pay themselves in longer period of time when mainte-
nance takes less time. These possible components include for example Polycom’s Re-
alPresence Resource Manager is available either as hardware or software. [28] 
4.1.7 Devices with secure settings 
So far the situation discussed has been a case of inadequately configured devices. But 
when crackers have enough knowledge and tools, devices can be breached even with 
secure settings on. This has been already done at Black Hat Europe Conference using 
vulnerabilities in the software so it is past being a theoretical threat. Details of this 
method are found in Moritz Jodeit’s research [34]; in this case it was done with certain 
Polycom HDX systems. Of course these specific security holes already have patches, 
but it is safe to assume there are still bugs in the management software or the H.323 
protocol. They are either not yet found or discovered by someone, but not revealed 
publicly. It is more a question of when than if. When these exploits are available, a 
possibility to call them is enough to take advantage of the exploits. [35: p. 7] 
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All unnecessary administrative interfaces should be disabled; they can potentially be 
used as an attack surface for malicious access to a device due to vulnerabilities. It may 
be possible to keep malicious access in the system even if updates are applied. This is 
done by booting the device temporarily in the development mode instead of the default 
production mode and by modifying the settings for outside connections. The command 
shell via telnet is one way to do it. The first access does not require any credentials, 
something worth noting. It was an unintended function in the software and later fixed in 
an update. Then the device is reverted back to the production mode and to the user 
everything seems normal on the surface. This is a worse situation than an average 
unpatched system because the issue may seem to be fixed when in fact they are inside 
with root access.  [35: p. 4] 
A second variation to the previous scenario is using vulnerability in the interface and 
through this security hole access is granted following a temporary downgrade to firm-
ware. Then rooting with the same method is done and upgraded back to the latest ver-
sion. Once again the system appears to be secure. 
Another aspect to consider is access to the whole internal network through one H.323 
device depending on topology. One weak spot can be enough to go around an other-
wise well protected network.   
4.1.8 H.323 Multipoint Control Unit (MCU) 
Multipoint Control Unit is necessary for calls that have more than two participants. It 
can be implemented as software or software and hardware handling call forwarding. 
MCU also offers additional security, because it stays between the callers and removes 
the point-to-point connection in the call.   
It is possible to decentralize MCU with H.323 if the devices support it. [36] Every partic-
ipant acts as MCU in the call and the quality may be better most of the time. A down-
side to this is higher bandwidth use because traffic is sent individually to everyone. In a 
way the same principle applies as with unicast and multicast. 
If MCU is taken over by crackers, the H.323 session is possible to capture without any-
one noticing. All data goes through MCU and this makes it a potential target. [37] 
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4.2 Audio over Ethernet 
4.2.1 Dante 
The transition to digital implementation of audio systems has started to get popularity in 
recent years. Until now technology was still developing to get to the point where it be-
came a plausible option for the average case. Audinate is an Australian based compa-
ny who developed Dante in 2006 and they are the current market leader. As technolo-
gy Dante is on layer 4, using the UDP protocol for audio packets. [38] The general in-
vestment level on market has been low in recent years and this has led to out dated 
competitive products for Dante. 
The following figures 3 and 4 are examples of typical Dante networks with some ana-
logue devices still included.  
 
Figure 3. An example of possible Dante audio network topology in church spanning over several 
rooms. [39] 
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Figure 3 above shows an Ethernet switch in the middle connected mostly to the red 
Rednet network audio interfaces, but also with a mixing console, DSP (Digital Signal 
Processor) for managing and monitoring audio and rack on stage. These audio inter-
faces translate an analogue signal to digital form from the speakers. Another switch 
connects the recording room to the network in the same way.  
 
Figure 4. Second scenario with Dante devices. [40] 
Figure 4 above shows live sound scenario as well with Dante devices. The mixing con-
sole is there the same way as previously, connected to a switch. On stage there is a 
switch, Rednet audio interfaces and a rack, also microphones and instruments with 
analogue signals. 
One variation to these diagrams is a situation where the signal is digital from the be-
ginning to the end and this setup would make audio interfaces unnecessary. The 
switches would be enough to connect the devices. PoE is needed on the switch, but a 
direct connection with the computer is also possible. [41] 
The Dante Virtual Soundcard is an option for a small scale, local solution. There is still 
a requirement for at least one Dante enabled device like mixing consoles or amplifiers. 
It is licensed software, one license per installed workstation. VMware or other similar 
solutions are not supported; latency would be a problem with the way virtual machines 
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work. A Gigabit port is recommended on the PC if over 32 channels are active, the 
maximum for the Virtual Soundcard is 64 channels. The PCI card on the other hand is 
capable of 128 channels and in heavy use it might be preferable compared to the Vir-
tual Soundcard. [42] Latency is also higher in the latter. Hardware performance is re-
lated to it; when latency is smaller a more powerful workstation is needed. This de-
pends on the current case, for example real time monitoring of sound requires low la-
tency [43: p. 59].  
Dante Via was published at the end of 2015 offering another software solution. [44] It 
does not require the Dante hardware to function, a standalone network is also possible. 
The main idea is to connect the individual devices to the PC and these separate in-
stances of devices are connected to each other. The main difference compared to the 
Virtual Soundcard is the lack of channel quantity. Via is optimal when a wide range of 
low end devices are used and connected to the same Dante network.   
4.2.2 Major players along Audinate 
The Audio Video Bridging (AVB) standard has a different approach to audio over 
Ethernet, also known as Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) now. It is a layer 2 solution 
at the moment; layer 3 features may come in future. [45: p. 12] [46] Time Sensitive 
Networking Task Group is responsible for this new initiate. Their plan is to be the 
standard for the industry and through that get manufacturers and customers to imple-
ment it in devices and networks. There are four IEEE 802.1 AVB standards that 
switches need to follow. These are 802.1BA [47] for the general AVB system, 802.1AS 
[48] for timing and synchronization and 802.1Qav [49] & 802.1Qat [50] for the equiva-
lent of QoS for AVB. The main advantage is low latency. This is achieved by reserving 
a determined portion of bandwidth and no other traffic will not use that reserved band-
width. [51] Dante has done this the opposite way and it seems to work better, functional 
solutions become standards eventually just by being dominant in the market. AVB Task 
Group has a certification program that tests the network equipment is compatible with 
IEEE standards. After which it can be publicly referred to as AVB compatible. Audinate 
has promised that Dante will be compatible with AVB when it is mature as a technolo-
gy. [42] 
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The German Ravenna is designed for specialized audio networks, broadcast networks. 
[52] Examples for these include live events and sports stadiums. It is compatible with 
the AES67 protocol which should make it possible to combine different manufacturers 
in same network. Among others Ravenna and Dante are already members of that 
group implementing AES67. [43: p. 66]     
4.2.3 Requirements of Dante for Ethernet network 
The requirement for switches and Ethernet network varies depending on what solution 
is selected. Specific details for each one are discussed separately. But on a general 
notion regardless of solution, be sure to give audio data and management data both 
separate Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) and some sort of QoS to prioritize the traf-
fic.   
Dante is designed to be easy to use and based on standards as much as possible. As 
such, no special switches are needed for a Dante compatible network. In theory there 
are several things needed. These include Gigabit port switches for lower latency than 1 
msec with a possibility down to 150 µsec [43: p. 24], Diffserv (DSCP) Quality of Service 
with strict priority and four queues and energy saving features turned off. While other-
wise a potentially good feature, energy efficiency can cause problems with Dante. [53] 
Dante devices use DHCP addresses by default, but some support static IP addresses. 
[42] 
But all these are standard functions found in switches. If a switch has standard Voice 
over IP QoS then Dante works also. Dante does not work with a wireless connection, 
which is one limitation it has. [42] While technically possible, it is not reliable enough. 
Consistent performance could not be guaranteed causing potential problems with la-
tency. 
Dante Controller is software used for routing and monitoring Dante network in various 
ways. [54] These are for example used bandwidth with unicast or multicast. Also differ-
ent kind of statistics like performance status, latency statistics and event logs. Other 
functionalities include among others configurable latency or latencies. By default it is 
the same, but different values can be configured at the same time to satisfy different 
needs. For instance live broadcast does not need as good quality as recording for later 
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use. Latency is also consistent and does not fluctuate as long as it is not set up too low 
causing audio packets unable to achieve that requirement in the network making 
glitches appear. The threshold for this depends on the size of the network. [43: p. 24] 
Dante Controller has one limitation for certain topologies; Dante devices can’t be in 
different subnets as far as any remotely practical solution goes. There is no real ad-
vantage for not putting them in the same subnet, but the network design could be done 
before the Dante system is even chosen or audio administrator may not always have 
the power to change IP addresses on the network. Whatever the case is, the easiest 
course of action is to find a way to use one subnet one way or another. Otherwise de-
vice management is more complex because one instance of Controller cannot manage 
the whole Dante network and Dante devices cannot interact with each other when in 
different subnets. [79] 
Presets are saved configurations that are possible to copy to other devices or just keep 
as backup to try new settings. [54] It is an xml-file that is possible to edit offline and use 
compatible settings in each device where loaded. If the device does not support a par-
ticular thing, the interface will say so.  
Figure 5 below shows an example of the interface and possible options to how to route 
Dante devices. The inputs and outputs have channels listed under them. The names of 
devices and channels can be renamed if the given name is difficult to read or remem-
ber. [55] 
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Figure 5. Dante Controller interface [55] 
4.2.4 Old layer 2 only solutions for audio networking 
Cobranet used to be a major player in networked audio markets, but have gradually 
lost market share to more advanced products. [15] They operate only on layer 2 and 
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this shows for example with the Quality of Service protocol. Layer 2 QoS has only lim-
ited functionality which may affect the performance on the audio network. 
Ethersound is another layer 2 solution and a rather old product. [15] While a competent 
solution years ago, at this day it has already lost its advantages compared to competi-
tors. Compatibility with networking equipment is problematic and the lack of layer 3 
protocols does not help either.  
With layer 2 solutions daisy chain topology was common and for example layer 3 Dan-
te does not support it most of the times usually using star topology and being connect-
ed to a switch. Daisy chain connects network devices in a chain and while easy to im-
plement, the same cannot be said for functionality. The hop count will get too big and 
traffic will slow down. All devices also become a single point of failure.  
4.2.5 Redundancy in Dante 
Dante devices have two Ethernet ports for redundancy, primary and secondary. [43: p. 
22] These are separated from each other and a secondary port can be used as back-
up. Configuring settings once is enough, both ports use these automatically. If the pri-
mary route loses the connection, the secondary should take the lead without any no-
ticeable disturbance between. The Dante Controller interface shows the status of sec-
ondary routes providing a way to check that the backup is working as planned. [56] 
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Figure 6. Redundancy setup for Dante network [57] 
The situation in Figure 6 above is fully backed up route where the primary and second-
ary networks are completely separate. This can be done also partially with a VLAN 
depending on how much redundancy is wanted in the network, for example using the 
same switch. [58] 
There is a recommended order to avoid potential problems when setting up this redun-
dancy. At first Dante devices are configured and then switches. After this the primary 
network route should be connected. When it works, the secondary network is connect-
ed and tested for functionality. [59] While redundancy is useful to have, it is good to at 
least acknowledge potential complexity in troubleshooting that primary and secondary 
ports may cause. On a related note, Dante Virtual Soundcard does not support redun-
dancy functions requiring Controller to do it. 
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4.3 IP announcement systems 
4.3.1 Challenging environments 
Announcement systems are used in many public places like airports, supermarkets and 
hospitals. One familiar example is schools where sound quality from speakers could 
have been better. It is not only a matter of being sensitive to sound quality; communica-
tion can also suffer to the point where the message is not understood anymore. At that 
point something needs to be done; the announcement system is not doing its work an-
ymore. For example train stations present a challenge to announcements. The area to 
cover is wide, background noise disrupts clear hearing, the smallest details can make 
the difference if it was helpful at all and finding a suitable volume level may be difficult, 
too loud hurts those who stand too near while too quiet volume is not good either. [60] 
In future more clear announcements are possible with software altering speech and 
making it possible to the lower volume level while still keeping the same level of under-
standing for listeners. [61] 
Public address systems can use wide variety of endpoints, but one specific example is 
smart phones using a location based service with GPS. When the user is in a certain 
location, the app gives the information in written form on a smart phone. So far this has 
been done at least in Australia with an app called OpenAccess Alerts [62]; up-to-date 
information requires the cooperation of local organizations. This would be a useful ser-
vice for the deaf and people with impaired hearing. [60: p. 8] 
There are many companies that manufacture IP speakers for announcement purposes. 
These include among others Valcom, CyberData, Atlas IED and Advanced Network 
Devices. [63] The management side has also many providers for public address sys-
tems, for example Singlewire [64], Syn-Apps [65], Honeywell [66] and Zenitel [67].  
   
   28 (45) 
 
  
 
Figure 7. Various components required for the IP announcement system [68] 
Figure 7 above shows speakers with or without IP amplifiers depending on the devices 
in question. Analogue speakers need IP amplifiers to be connected with a switch while 
Ethernet compatible speakers are connected straight to the network. Lastly, intercoms 
offer two way communications to a specific location and if required, also IP access con-
trol or IP camera. Management software and a microphone are used to control this 
network as a whole. 
4.3.2 Possible uses for the announcement systems 
Voice over IP phones are a possibility when deciding what end points to connect to the 
network and be used to make announcements. This gives the added benefit of more 
digitalized components. 
   29 (45) 
 
  
It is possible to use intercom over WAN. This opens possibilities to communicate long-
er distances without additional systems. Management and monitoring is also possible 
from a remote location if the topology requires this functionality. [69] [70] 
Digital announcement systems may use SIP over TCP protocol instead of UDP to 
make sure packets reach their destination. There are similarities with VoIP protocol, 
SIP and RTP protocols are used. Most likely DHCP is also supported.  
Intercoms can be combined with access control and surveillance cameras to remotely 
interact with a person in a building, establishing two way communications with sound 
and audio. This offers many possibilities. Recording audio and video through the sys-
tems is also technically possible, but legal problems may provide obstacles for imple-
mentation. 
A wired connection is not mandatory for public announcement systems, wireless works 
as well. This broadens situations where digital systems can be applied; sometimes the 
wireless option is easier and/or a cheaper way in individual locations. Another addition-
al useful feature is a desktop computer acting as a speaker for IP announcements, for 
example InformaCast supports this. Depending on topology it may fill the need for a 
speaker, an example would be a room that always has a powered on computer and 
user sitting nearby it, therefore the volume level is also enough for its purpose. [71] 
Figure 8 below shows a topology for the announcement network and possibility for 
wireless connection for remote speakers. The management software here is Talkmas-
ter from Kintronics which offers various ways to configure and manage devices. 
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Figure 8. Topology for announcement network [72] 
5 Conclusions 
This section discusses what should be done based on theory of previously analysed 
systems. In addition, it describes what conditions are required from the network and 
how the different requirements for properties affect the chosen solutions. 
5.1 Video conferencing 
It is relatively easy to set up a video conferencing system, but another thing to get a 
secure system. It takes effort to configure the firewall and harden the devices. [73] [74] 
Dedicated systems vary in size. Some can be small and others big and expensive for 
bigger offices depending also on the budget available. Depending on the solution a 
different amount of configuration is required. 
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Cloud based systems have a different angle; they are easier to scale to different situa-
tions. The solution is often offered as one license per user without any need for expen-
sive investments in conference rooms. As such the cost per user is probably less than 
with dedicated systems. These systems work either with additional hardware or only 
software on workstation. [75] Updating is easier in this case, often automatic. This is 
one factor to consider, keeping dedicated devices up to date is one more task for IT 
infrastructure maintenance which has to be done regularly. 
The drawback is of course the reduced amount of control over the system. Using video 
conferencing on the cloud means that the user considers the service provider trustwor-
thy for the information processed and data stored there. If this is not the case then an-
other solution should be found. Critical data for the organization is probably best to 
keep off the cloud to be on the safe side.    
General best practices for secure network and IT systems also apply here. Default 
usernames and passwords should be changed from factory settings and all devices put 
behind firewall. This protection is not only for pure security reasons, it also prevents 
DOS and DDOS attacks from taking down the service. It is good practice to logically 
isolate video and audio traffic with VLANs in the network for extra security.  
The probability of breaches should affect how strong actions are taken. Unless there is 
a need for strong security, the costs are probably a decisive factor. The starting point is 
to keep the times and dates of sessions only between persons who need the infor-
mation. It may attract unwanted attention when the schedule is known for the public. 
If sessions are recorded, access to the recordings should be controlled. For these to 
fall into wrong hands is the same as letting them to spy on a live session. It is good to 
check out what the laws say if recordings contain medical or otherwise sensitive infor-
mation. 
Many things that can be done to harden devices from relatively insecure default set-
tings. It depends on the manufacturer how much hardening is needed, but most things 
apply to all videoconferencing devices. [76: p. 23] 
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The first thing to disable is auto-answer. It is already discussed in detail in insecure 
default settings and what should be done if this is required anyway. It is risky for the 
small comfort it gives. Default usernames and passwords should also be changed like 
in every device. 
There are hardware and software available that allow centralized management and 
make it possible to maintain devices with less effort. This may improve security indi-
rectly because a more complex setup is possible to keep intact with a larger amount of 
devices and updating is more organized. 
Various issues with video conferencing have been covered in thesis, but these included 
some form of flawed settings exposing devices. If all points are covered, the situation is 
under control and most likely secure. There are ways to get through even in this case 
and this has been done already. There is no need to fear this and let it affect too much, 
but at the same time also avoid overconfidence that potential threats are not relevant to 
the system in use. Since new threats could eventually evolve to bypass security, even 
a secure network needs a fresh overview once in a while. 
The question of one or several vendors in a network is a priority between compatibility 
and security, as is the amount of maintenance. A network including only one vendor for 
one type of device has a benefit of built compatibility between devices. At the same 
time it exposes to the same bugs in the code. It is possible to have the same security 
hole existing in several vendors’ systems, but it is not the most probable scenario.    
5.2 Audio over Ethernet 
Audio over Ethernet as technology is developing all the time, but fully digitalized audio 
networks as a standard solution are still in future. There are still a lot of existing and 
fully functional audio equipment with administrators who are cautious to implement new 
technology. It will reach that point slowly, but eventually. 
Technology can be the best on a technical level, but it does not automatically mean it 
will spread to customers. AVB still requires more support from switches. The current 
infrastructure of switches most likely needs to be replaced if used with AVB and switch 
   33 (45) 
 
  
models that support it are limited in number. [77] This makes the transition more diffi-
cult. The lack of license fees balances the scale a little bit for the purchase of switches 
that are more expensive than the same level switch without AVB compatibility. If the 
support increases in future, the situation may change in favour of AVB. But AVB may 
have a better future in the automotive and industrial sector even if audio networking 
does not work for them in the end. They operate also under the name Time Sensitive 
Networking Task Group now. 
5.2.1 Transition from analogue to digital 
The transition from analogue to digital is just beginning in audio control systems. Ana-
logue systems have been the way to go for a long time and changes take a while. But it 
is coming slowly. There are some cases where analogue might still be better than a 
digital system, especially if lower than normal latency is required. Or maybe the situa-
tion is cabling one smaller physical location and it is enough to cover everything. In that 
case the difference between two systems is smaller in management complexity, moni-
toring and costs.  
A digital system is cheaper and easier to set up, also saving a lot of space from all 
copper wiring. In past there were serious problems with various aspects that delayed 
the transition and kept old ways going. Possible obstacles included for example poor 
support with switches or limited functionality. 
5.2.2 Security 
There are three main reasons why security in IP audio networks is less of an issue than 
on average network application. IP audio networks operate by design mostly in internal 
networks only behind a firewall and as such do not need the same level of security than 
systems communicating with the outside world. A second factor is the relative lack of 
confidential information or benefits to crackers. There are more than enough better 
targets out there. Lastly sabotaging an audio network is hardly worth the effort consid-
ering what needs to be done. If the firewall is bypassed on a network, chances are that 
limited opportunity is used for something else before risking detection with the audio 
network. After audio data is processed, stored and not managed under Dante, for the 
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purposes of this analysis data is considered more under general data security than in 
IP audio networking. 
Standard security features in network equipment and especially port security apply 
here the same way as would be expected. Usefulness of adding security features is 
always relative to the system where it is applied. In this case there is no real advantage 
what would be gained with it not counting the previously mentioned actions. One pos-
sibility is for example restricting management access of the Dante network to only a 
certain end device with VLAN. Dante audio inputs and outputs need to see each other 
clearly for the system to work and have as fast route between each other as possible.  
Low latency is an important part of performance and relevant to keep in check. In 
summary it could be said that normal procedures in network security provide sufficient 
protection from possible threats. Without low latency or good usability Audio over 
Ethernet would not be a better option over analogue systems even with all its ad-
vantages. 
When the audio network covers multiple physical locations and traffic going between 
them, VPN could be turned on. It does not affect the quality of audio data, but addition-
al latency usually comes with it. In most cases it is not a problem since raw audio data 
is managed in LAN, this is the part where latency matters most. After the audio data is 
processed and ready to send forward, suitable latency can be selected for each situa-
tion. 
5.3 IP Announcement systems 
The main difference between Dante-like systems and IP announcement systems could 
be the most critical factor in transmission. Both transmit audio over network, but the 
former prioritizes latency when on other hand the latter favours getting all packets to 
the destination at the cost of latency at least in the critical systems. For example music 
can fit to both cases depending on the case; background music would better fit to an-
nouncement systems and live music to Dante. Another way to differentiate the two sys-
tems is the usability in an emergency situation. 
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Compared to an analogue system an IP based system scales easier when new devices 
are added, they can be connected to existing network without long wires everywhere. It 
is cheaper and less time consuming to set up. Maintenance is easier when the system 
gives an indication whether or not all devices are working, i.e. gives out status reports. 
The relative price for an analogue system increases for every building and location 
necessary to cover. [72] 
Normal network security procedures apply for announcement systems. These include 
up-to-date management systems protected with passwords, port security, subnets and 
devices behind firewall. Applying encryption with VPN for connection over WAN is a 
good precaution.  
IP speakers with built-in amplifiers may be suitable to the case at hand if high power 
levels (W) are not required. A more powerful separate amplifier can power up louder 
speaker or several speakers with average sound volume, a suitable level can be pur-
chased to get a cost effective solution with the intended sound properties. More power-
ful models of IP speakers with their own power supply may also fit the purpose. A long-
er distance and louder sound level need more power; each increase in volume means 
higher relative increase in power use. This makes louder speakers to consume a lot of 
power. [78] 
Selective use of speakers is possible when needed for example in hospitals [66]. It is 
not only convenient to target a specific location, but also critical in some cases. Emer-
gency situations may require communication to certain location or locations in order to 
save lives, broadcasting universally everywhere could create panic and make the situa-
tion more difficult to manage. 
6 Closure 
Regardless of recent years’ increase in service based video conferencing, there is also 
room for traditional systems in the market. Cloud based systems most likely increase 
popularity on the low end and partly in the middle. It is easier and cheaper to imple-
ment this securely. The service will take care most of it assuming of course that the 
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service provider is trustworthy. But these do not have the same level of quality and 
usability as more expensive options. 
It does not have to mean choosing one or another, the most secure way can be a com-
bination of both. For daily use, a lighter version might be sufficient and at the same 
time a limited number of dedicated devices exists to cover for cases where it is re-
quired. In this scenario, maintenance is easier to manage and through that make a 
more secure implementation more probable. 
There are many things in video conferencing that can be done to mitigate the threats, 
small and big. What are the correct choices depends entirely on the situation; different 
networks have different level of needs for security. There is almost always some kind of 
cost for security. These are financial cost, more laborious maintenance, decrease of 
usability, compatibility and/or performance. 
After a proper analysis of what is an optimal and secure solution there are a few ways 
to continue. If superior quality of video and audio with features is a priority for video 
conferencing then dedicated systems are the correct choice. With a properly planned 
implementation regarding security, there is little risk for breaches. Of course the system 
won’t be one hundred percent immune to attacks, but most systems rarely are that. 
When easier targets are available with the same reward, the effort tends to go towards 
them.  
Audio over Ethernet systems are a small and specialized part of the network world and 
due to this have received little to none attention from big players like Cisco. This has 
led to a situation where two different approaches merged to market. Dante works with 
off-the-shelf switches with minimal investment required. Regardless of current network, 
Dante most likely works there. Features are sufficient and more are in development. 
The interface also seems easy to use. These factors probably keep Dante on the num-
ber one place in the market for a while.   
AVB/TSN on the other hand tries to establish a new standard aiming for compatibility 
on Audio over Ethernet field and is losing the momentum ironically because of that ex-
act reason. It is not compatible with standard switches and if this does not improve 
soon, recently published AES67 will take over this task instead. It does not try to be 
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ambitious and replace everything, only what is necessary. Practice has shown this 
pragmatic approach works.  
While both previously mentioned Audio over Ethernet and public announcement use 
sound systems, the priorities are different. For the former audio quality is important. IP 
Announcement systems on the other hand prioritize reliability.  
Compared to analogue systems digital implementation is a more attractive option and 
advantages increase in relation to the more complex the system gets and the longer 
the distances between the devices get. In terms of security, there are no serious 
threats for announcement systems that would need to be addressed. Typical network 
procedures are sufficient.  
7 Summary 
The starting point for this thesis was the notion that video conferencing equipment 
might have security problems. 
There were problems to keep the content within a reasonable amount with the current 
focus, and many topics were discussed less or not at all. To limit the range of topics to 
a reasonable level, only the minimum depth necessary was analysed. These include 
VoIP, video walls, various protocols and general topics related to video conferencing, 
for example the wide range of products that exist. While useful knowledge, it is not in 
the scope of this thesis. The portion of the video conferencing content was becoming 
too big and it was limited to make it smaller.  
Only a few major manufacturers were mentioned in passing a few times. The same 
policy was chosen for IP announcement systems, some example products were intro-
duced on a general level. No content for hands on configuration or command line 
commands were written on purpose as this was not relevant for the scope of this the-
sis. 
There were some problems to find constructive critic about Dante aside from obvious 
marketing material of its rivals. Sometimes it felt too good to be true because the infor-
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mation found was almost too positive. Some information was found, however, that Dan-
te may not perform with 100% reliability, but it wasn’t possible to confirm whether this is 
true or not and because of the lack of proper sources it wasn’t mentioned in this thesis. 
There was no Dante network available for the purposes of the thesis where this hy-
pothesis could be tested.  
A similar issue was the scenario with Dante devices spread to more than one subnet 
under Dante Controller. Audinate announced in 2011 that software called Netspander 
will be published and after that the knowledge of it almost disappeared without any 
mention on the official website. Several isolated pieces of information from unofficial 
sources were found stating that this functionality was integrated to the system later on, 
but there was no clarification from Audinate that this is the case. An inquiry was sent to 
their customer support and they responded saying Dante Controller does not support 
several subnets. [79] 
After researching for potential threats, no major security holes were found uniquely 
from Audio over Ethernet or IP announcement systems. Both systems operate mainly 
behind a firewall and are therefore protected by normal security procedures. Because 
of this, the content for these systems was less concentrated on security than on video 
conferencing and more on a concept level.      
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